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Abstract. Some major financial markets are currently reporting that
50% or more of all transactions are now executed by automated trad-
ing systems (ATS). To understand the impact of ATS proliferation on
the global financial markets, academic studies often use standard ref-
erence strategies, such as “AA” and “ZIP”, to model the behaviour of
real trading systems. Disturbingly, we show that the reference algorithms
presented in the literature are ambiguous, thus reducing the validity of
strict comparative studies. As a remedy, we suggest disambiguated stan-
dard implementations of AA and ZIP. Using Exchange Portal (ExPo),
an open-source financial exchange simulation platform designed for real-
time behavioural economic experiments involving human traders and/or
trader-agents, we study the e↵ects of disambiguating AA and ZIP, before
introducing a novel method of assignment-adaptation (ASAD). Exper-
iments show that introducing ASAD agents into a market with shocks
can produce counter-intuitive market dynamics.
Keywords: Software agents, auctions, agent-based computational eco-
nomics, ACE, agent-based modelling, ABM, automated trading, compu-
tational finance, ExPo, Exchange Portal, Assignment Adaptation.
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2001, a team of researchers at IBM [9] reported on a series of experiments
to test the e ciency of two adaptive trading-agent algorithms, MGD [16] and
ZIP [8], when competing directly against human traders. Previous studies us-
ing homogeneous trader populations of all-humans or all-agents had indicated
that, in both cases, trading interactions within the populations rapidly and ro-
bustly converged toward theoretically optimal, and stable, dynamic equilibria.
IBM’s results demonstrated for the first time that, in heterogeneous popula-
tions mixing human traders with trader-agents, both MGD and ZIP consistently
out-performed the human traders, achieving greater e ciency by making more
profitable transactions. The IBM authors concluded with a prescient statement,
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predicting: “in many real marketplaces, agents of su cient quality will be de-
veloped such that most agents beat most humans”. Hindsight shows that they
were correct: in many of the world’s major financial markets, transactions that
used to take place between human traders are now being fulfilled electronically,
at super-human speeds, by automated trading (AT) and high frequency trad-
ing (HFT) systems. AT and HFT systems are typically highly autonomous and
dynamically adapt to changes in the market’s prevailing conditions: for any rea-
sonable definition of software agent, it is clear that AT/HFT systems can be
considered as software agents, even though practitioners in the finance industry
typically do not make much use of the phrase.
However, as the number of AT and HFT systems has increased, and as the bil-
lions of dollars worth of daily transaction volumes that they control has steadily
risen, a worrying gap has emerged between theory and practice. Commercial
deployments of AT/HFT continue to proliferate (some major financial markets
are currently reporting that 50% or more of transactions are now executed by
automated agents), yet theoretical understanding of the impact of trading agent
technologies on the system-level dynamics of financial markets is dangerously
deficient. To address this problem, in 2010 the UK Government’s O ce for Sci-
ence (UKGoS) launched a two year “Foresight” project entitled “The Future of
Computer Trading in Financial Markets”.1
One report [12] commissioned by that project and published by UKGoS at-
tempted a replication of IBM’s study, but with two extensions: firstly, trading
agents used the Adaptive Aggressive (AA) strategy [26], which had previously
been shown to outperform both MGD and ZIP [11]; secondly, to increase the ex-
perimental “realism”, order assignments to trade were continuously replenished,
thus producing a continuous “drip-feed” market that more closely approximates
the real world, rather than a discrete, periodic market as had been used in
almost all prior experimental studies. Results showed that, under these exper-
imental conditions, agents were less e cient than human traders, with slower
markets hindering agent performance but enhancing human performance [12].
In this paper, we perform two sets of experiments. Firstly, we replicate the
continuous replenishment experiments of [12] using ExPo: The Exchange Portal,
an open-source platform designed to facilitate financial trading experiments be-
tween humans, agents, or both [13]. However, unlike [12], we study agent-only
markets. Perhaps surprisingly, we believe that this is the first time agent-only
markets have been studied using continuous replenishment of order assignments.
For our trading agents, we use two well-known “reference” algorithms from the
trading-agent literature, AA [26] and ZIP [8].
In our second set of experiments, we introduce “market shocks” to the system
and explore a novel extension to the reference algorithms (assignment-adaptive,
or ASAD, agents), designed to enable agents to take advantage of such shocks.
We demonstrate that if all agents in the market are ASAD, then the market is
more e cient in the presence of market shocks than if all agents are non-ASAD.
1 The final report from that investigation was published in Oct. 2012, and is available
at: http://bit.ly/UvGE4Q.
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However, somewhat counter-intuitively, when the market is a heterogeneous mix-
ture of ASAD and non-ASAD, non-ASAD agents outperform ASAD agents by
adapting to the new price signals generated by ASAD agents.
This paper is organised as follows.2 In Section 2 we review the literature
on financial trading agent experiments and the agent algorithms, AA and ZIP.
In Section 3 we introduce ExPo, our experimental platform, and describe our
experimental design. In Section 4 we present the results from our two sets of
experiments. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 The Continuous Double Auction
An auction is a mechanism whereby sellers and buyers come together and agree
on a transaction price. Many auction mechanisms exist, each governed by a
di↵erent set of rules. In this paper, we focus on the Continuous Double Auction
(CDA), the most widely used auction mechanism and the one used to control
all the world’s major financial exchanges. The CDA enables buyers and sellers
to freely and independently exchange quotes at any time. Transactions occur
when a seller accepts a buyer’s “bid”, or when a buyer accepts a seller’s “ask”.
Although it is possible for any seller to accept any buyer’s bid, and vice-versa,
it is in both of their interests to get the best deal possible at any point in time.
Thus, transactions execute with a counter party that o↵ers the most competitive
quote.
Vernon Smith explored the dynamics of CDA markets in a series of Nobel
Prize winning experiments using small groups of human participants [20]. Split-
ting participants evenly into a group of buyers and a group of sellers, Smith
handed out a single card (an assignment) to each buyer and seller with a single
limit price written on each, known only to that individual. The limit price on the
card for buyers (sellers) represented the maximum (minimum) price they were
willing to pay (accept) for a fictitious commodity. Participants were given strict
instructions to not bid (ask) a price higher (lower) than that shown on their
card, and were encouraged to bid lower (ask higher) than this price, regarding
any di↵erence between the price on the card and the price achieved in the market
as profit.
Experiments were split into a number of “trading days”, each typically lasting
a few minutes. At any point during the trading day, a buyer or seller could
raise their hand and announce a quote. When a seller and a buyer agreed on a
quote, a transaction was made. At the end of each trading day, all stock (sellers
assignment cards) and money (buyer assignment cards) was recalled, and then
reallocated anew at the start of the next trading day. By controlling the limit
prices allocated to participants, Smith was able to control the market’s supply
and demand schedules. Smith found that, typically after a couple of trading days,
human traders achieved very close to 100% allocative e ciency; a measure of
2 For an earlier version of the work presented here, we refer the reader to [23].
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Fig. 1. Supply and Demand curves (here illustrated as straight lines) show the quan-
tities supplied by sellers and demanded by buyers at every price-point. In general, as
price increases, the quantity supplied increases and the quantity demanded falls. The
point at which the two curves intersect is the theoretical equilibrium point; where Q0
is the equilibrium quantity and P0 is the equilibrium price.
the percentage of profit in relation to the maximum theoretical profit available
(see Section 2.2). This was a significant result: few people had believed that a
very small number of inexperienced, self-interested participants could e↵ectively
self-equilibrate.
2.2 Measuring Market Performance
An “ideal” market can be perfectly described by the aggregate quantity supplied
by sellers and the aggregate quantity demanded by buyers at every price-point
(i.e., the market’s supply and demand schedules, Figure 1). As prices increase,
in general there is a tendency for supply to increase, with increased potential
revenues from sales encouraging more sellers to enter the market; while, at the
same time, there is a tendency for demand to decrease as buyers look to spend
their money elsewhere. At some price-point, the quantity demanded will equal
the quantity supplied. This is the theoretical market equilibrium. An idealised
theoretical market (and many real ones) has a market equilibrium price and
quantity (P0, Q0) determined by the intersection between the supply and de-
mand schedules. The dynamics of competition in the market will tend to drive
transactions toward this equilibrium point. For all prices above P0, supply will
exceed demand, forcing suppliers to reduce their prices to make a trade; whereas
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for all prices below P0, demand exceeds supply, forcing buyers to increase their
price to make a trade. Any quantity demanded or supplied below Q0 is called
“intra-marginal”; all quantity demanded or supplied in excess of Q0, is called
“extra-marginal”. In an ideal market, all intra-marginal units and no extra-
marginal units are expected to trade.
In the real world, markets are not ideal. They will always trade away from
equilibrium at least some of the time. We can use metrics to calculate the “per-
formance” of a market by how far from ideal equilibrium it trades, allowing us to
compare between markets. In this report, we make use of the following metrics:
Smith’s alpha Following Vernon Smith [20], we measure the equilibration
(equilibrium-finding) behaviour of markets using the coe cient of convergence,
↵, defined as the root mean square di↵erence between each of n transaction
prices, pi (for i = 1 . . . n) over some period, and the P0 value for that period,
expressed as a percentage of the equilibrium price:
↵ =
100
P0
vuut 1
n
nX
i=1
(pi   P0)2. (1)
In essence, ↵ captures the standard deviation of trade prices about the theoretical
equilibrium. A low value of ↵ is desirable, indicating trading close to P0.
Allocative E ciency For each trader, i, the maximum theoretical profit avail-
able, ⇡⇤i , is the di↵erence between the price they are prepared to pay (their “limit
price”) and the theoretical market equilibrium price, P0. E ciency, E, is used to
calculate the performance of a group of n traders as the mean ratio of realised
profit, ⇡i, to theoretical profit, ⇡⇤i :
E =
1
n
nX
i=1
⇡i
⇡⇤i
. (2)
As profit values cannot go below zero (traders in these experiments are not
allowed to enter into loss-making deals), a value of 1.0 indicates that the group
has earned the maximum theoretical profit available, ⇡⇤i , on all trades. A value
below 1.0 indicates that some opportunities have been missed. Finally, a value
above 1.0 means that additional profit has been made by taking advantage of
a trading counterparty’s willingness to trade away from P0. So, for example, a
group of sellers might record an allocative e ciency of 1.2 if their counterparties
(a group of buyers) consistently enter into transactions at prices greater than
P0; in such a situation, the buyers’ allocative e ciency would not be more than
0.8.
Profit Dispersion Profit dispersion is a measure of the extent to which the
profit/utility generated by a group of traders in the market di↵ers from the profit
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that would be expected of them if all transactions took place at the equilibrium
price, P0. For a group of n traders, profit dispersion is calculated as the root
mean square di↵erence between the profits achieved, ⇡i, by each trader, i, and
the maximum theoretical profit available, ⇡⇤i :
⇡disp =
vuut 1
n
nX
i=1
(⇡i   ⇡⇤i )2. (3)
Low values of ⇡disp indicate that traders are extracting actual profits close to
profits available when all trades take place at the equilibrium price P0. In con-
trast, higher values of ⇡disp indicate that traders’ profits di↵er from those ex-
pected at equilibrium. Since zero-sum e↵ects between buyers and sellers do not
mask profit dispersion, this statistic is attractive [17].
2.3 Algorithmic Traders
Zero-Intelligence Plus (ZIP) agents were developed by Dave Cli↵ [8] to
overcome the provable shortcomings of Gode & Sunder’s ZI-C agents [17]. ZIP
agents are profit-driven traders that adapt using a simple learning mechanism:
adjust profit margins based on the price of other bids and o↵ers in the market,
and decide whether to make a transaction or not. When a decision to raise or
lower a ZIP trader’s profit margin, µi(t), is taken, ZIP modifies the value using
market data and an adaptation rule based on the Widrow-Ho↵ “delta rule” [28]:
 i(t) =  i(⌧i(t)  pi(t)), (4)
where  i is the learning rate, pi is the quote price and ⌧i is the target price (based
on the price of the last quote in the market). At time t, an update to the profit
margin, µi, takes the form:
µi(t+ 1) =
pi(t) +  i(t+ 1)
li   1 , (5)
and
 i(t+ 1) =  i(t) + (1   i) i(t), (6)
where  i(t+1) is the amount of change on the transition from t to t+1, and  i
is the momentum coe cient. Given the limit price, li, of the current assignment,
ZIP then updates its profit margin, µi(t), based on these trading rules, where
the final quote price, pi, is given as:
pi = li(1 + µ(t)). (7)
The ZIP strategy has become a popular benchmark for CDA experiments.
In their IBM study, [9] concluded that ZIP was a dominant strategy, beating
humans in experimental trials and matching the performance of their own mod-
ified GD [16] algorithmic trader. More recently, ZIP has again been shown to
outperform humans [10,11]. However, it is no longer considered the dominant
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agent strategy (having been shown to be beaten by AA; see Section 2.3). ZIP
has also been tested against humans in a continuous “drip-feed” market, where
ZIP was shown to be less e cient than humans (a result that surprised the au-
thors) [7,12]. However, we believe that De Luca’s implementation of ZIP [18]
that was used in those experiments may have played some part in this result.
The original implementation of ZIP [8] was designed to handle only one limit
price, had no explicit notion of time and no persistent orders. So, when the
IBM team used ZIP to conduct human vs. agent experiments, they adapted ZIP
for their platform [9]. In order to handle persistent orders, a “sleep time” was
introduced into ZIP, such that if no trade took place within a given time period,
then the ZIP agent would automatically initiate a competitive price movement,
i.e., a price movement towards the best value on the other side of the order book
[ibid]. Perhaps more importantly, ZIP was further modified to have a vector of
internal price variables, allowing profit to be made at di↵erent values for di↵erent
assignments. These modifications were similar to an alternative implementation
that had been independently proposed in a previous study [19]. Other versions
of ZIP also appear in the literature. In [26], ZIP (and presumably, also AA)
algorithms were forced to update only the most profitable bid (for buyers) or ask
(for sellers) at any one time. This approach was replicated in De Luca’s open-
source implementation of ZIP and AA [18]. Finally, ZIP has also been adapted to
enable arbitrage, by allowing an individual agent to both buy and sell. Initially
introduced by [25], and recently adapted by [2], ZIP “arbitrageurs” contain two
profit margins (buy and sell) and the price adjustment mechanism adjusts two
prices each time the agent receives new market information. For this reason, ZIP
arbitrageurs can be considered equivalent to two standard ZIP agents (one buyer
and one seller) working as a team.
Here, we test to see whether a ZIP implementation with multiple profit mar-
gins, ZIPM , is more e cient than a ZIP trader with a single profit margin, ZIPS .
As far as we are aware, this comparison has not been directly tested before. We
use ZIPS to describe the implementation in [26], where only the most profitable
order is updated on every wakeup; and ZIPM to denote an implementation of
ZIP similar to that used in [9,19,24], such that ZIPM is capable of updating all
profit margins for all orders simultaneously. Every unique limit price received is
given a new µ and   (the values of µ and   are decided at random when the
agent is started) and all ZIP parameters are the same as those used in [8].
Adaptive-Aggressive (AA) agents were developed by Vytelingum [26] to ex-
plicitly model “aggressiveness”—trading the opportunity of extra profit for the
certainty of transacting. Aggressive agents enter competitive bids (or asks) for
a quick trade, while passive agents forgo the chance of a quick trade in order
to hold out for greater profit. To control the level of aggressiveness, AA uses
the Widrow-Ho↵ delta rule [28] that is also used in ZIP (equation 4). However,
whereas ZIP uses learning to update profit margin, AA updates an aggression
parameter based on previous market information. At time, t, AA estimates the
competitive equilibrium price, p⇤, based on a moving window of historic mar-
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ket transaction prices; p⇤ is then used in AA’s long-term adaptation component,
which updates ✓, a property of the aggressiveness model. In this long-term adap-
tation component, an internal estimate of Smith’s ↵ (equation 1) is calculated,
enabling the agent to detect and react to price volatility. AA was developed to
perform well in dynamic markets. Short-term learning is used to react to the
current state of the market, while long-term learning is used to react to market
trends. AA has been shown to dominate other agent strategies in the literature
[11,26], however, unlike ZIP, which has been independently re-implemented by
many di↵erent researchers, we believe the only replication of AA in the literature
prior to this study is De Luca’s OpEx implementation [18].
In Vytelingum’s original AA implementation [26], it is unclear how an agent
should quote when the market first opens and is empty. In De Luca’s version
[18], AA uses the maximum bid or ask price allowed in the market, Pmax = 400,
to determine an agent’s initial quote price, pt=0, such that pt=0 is a random
variable from a uniform distribution with range [0.15Pmax, 0.85Pmax]. In the ab-
sence of any “real” market data, the value pt=0 acts as a proxy for the initial
estimate of market equilibrium. But, since pt=0 is artificially constrained by the
arbitrary market value Pmax, we believe that this method of generating pt=0 is
not domain independent and may present AA with an unfair “equilibrium find-
ing” advantage when compared with other agent strategies, such as ZIP, which
do not have access to this parameter. Moreover, for their first quote price, De
Luca’s OpEx agents [18] do not make use of the limit prices of their internal
assignments (other than to maximally bound the quote at the bid limit and
minimally bound at the ask limit). We believe this to be unrealistic. At the
beginning of the market the only information agents have available for price dis-
covery are their own personal assignments. Therefore, it is intuitive that agents
should try to benefit from any information contained therein. For this reason, we
introduce a modification to AA whereby agents set their own internal estimation
of Pmax such that Pmax equals twice the maximum assignment limit price an
agent holds.3 Readers should note that agents could only submit a quote once
they had received an assignment to trade.
In March 2012, an unexpected “max spread rule” in De Luca’s AA code of
OpEx version 1 was exposed [5]. This rule states that an agent should automat-
ically execute against the best quote on the other side of the book if the relative
spread (the di↵erence between best quotes on either side of the book) is within
a threshold, maxSpread (and within limit price range).4 Although this rule is
not described in the definition of AA, we believe that it is a vestigial morph
of a spread rule appearing in Risk-Based (RB) agents [27], a previous trader
agent that Vytelingum eventually developed into AA [26]. The max spread rule
encourages De Luca’s AA agents to “jump the spread” for a quick transaction.
However, in OpEx version 1, maxSpread was hard-coded to a value of 15%. Fol-
3 We do not suggest that two is the optimum multiplier for this equation; rather we
aim to investigate the e↵ect of introducing this modification and select two as a
simple heuristic estimate.
4 For a lengthy discussion on the consequences of the max spread rule, see [5].
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Fig. 2. ExPo Architecture. The ExPo exchange is a Ruby on Rails web server ap-
plication with RESTful architecture, using a MySQL database for storage. Clients
(automated trader agents, or human traders using a web browser) connect and mes-
sage the server using HTTP messaging. ExPo internal servers communicate via unix
sockets.
lowing [5], we believe that this value is unrealistically large and therefore casts
a question of doubt on the validity of previous experimental results gathered
using these agents.5 In this paper, we explore the e↵ect of the spread-jumping
rule. Unless otherwise stated, we remove the maxSpread condition (i.e., set
maxSpread = 0% for our AA agents). All other AA parameters are set to those
suggested by [26]. Following the literature, we also use the rule of updating only
the most profitable bid (for buyers) or ask (for sellers) at any one time (similar
to ZIPS).
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 ExPo: Exchange Portal Platform
Exchange Portal [13] is a real-time online financial trading exchange platform
designed to run controlled scientific trading experiments between human traders
and automated trader robots (see Figure 2). ExPo was developed at the Uni-
versity of Bristol as both a teaching and research platform and has been open-
sourced as a gift to the wider research community. ExPo can be run across a
5 Since this issue was raised by [5], the spread jumping rule has subsequently been clas-
sified as a bug and removed from De Luca’s OpEx AA agents (http://sourceforge.
net/p/open-exchange/tickets/1/).
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Fig. 3. Screenshot of ExPo’s auction configuration GUI, used to initialise a financial
trading experiment. Top: the auction parameters table is used to name a market ex-
periment, define the market running time, set the market equilibrium price, link to
the trader agent algorithm code, and select whether or not human users are able to
participate. Bottom: the assignment sequences for participants are configured using the
text boxes on the left, and illustrated dynamically by the graph on the right, with the
blue line indicating aggregate market demand and the yellow line indicating aggregate
market supply.
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Fig. 4. ExPo screenshot of the admin screen (not available to ordinary market par-
ticipants) during an open market period. Top-left: table showing details of all traders
(human and robot) participating in the market. Top-right: the public order book dis-
plays current prices and volumes quoted in the market. Bottom-left: execution prices
of trades are plotted dynamically. Bottom-right: an exportable list of all market trans-
actions are detailed.
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Fig. 5. Supply and demand assignment sequences used for experiments. Left: equilib-
rium price, P0 = 230. Right: equilibrium price P0 = 300. Each agent (3 buyers and 3
sellers) receives 6 assignments per assignment “loop”, hence the total volume demanded
and supplied per loop is 18 and Q0/loop = 9. Assignments are allocated in pairs (to
one seller and one buyer) every second, with each agent receiving a new assignment on
average every 3s. Assignment loops are repeated 64 times, producing a total experiment
running time of 1152s, and an equilibrium quantity Q0 = 64⇥ 9 = 576.
network (e.g., the internet), with human and/or automated trader agents mes-
saging the exchange via HTTP. Alternatively, ExPo can be run on a single ma-
chine, with all clients running locally. For all experiments detailed in this paper,
we run ExPo and the agent traders on the same physical machine. Prior to run-
ning experiments, ExPo was stress-tested through a rigorous series of agent-only
experiments (see [22]).
Figures 3 and 4 show a typical set up for an auction using the admin GUI
(Figure 3) and an example of ExPo in operation (Figure 4). The assignment
sequences for participants are looped until the end of the auction. When com-
petitors are added to an auction through the automation scripts, they are put on
the same assignment sequences as already exist in the market. This is designed
to avoid accidentally introducing an asymmetrical advantage for any one group.
3.2 Experiment Design
Market environments used in previous experiments typically follow the “trad-
ing day” model of Smith’s original experiments (notable exceptions include
[5,6,7,12]). The problem with this is that it assumes traders only get new as-
signments at the start of each trading day—typically only one assignment each.
Platforms like ExPo help to model markets in a more realistic way. By modelling
a market as a continuous replenishment auction, we are able to model in real
time, allowing assignments to drip feed into the market like they would if you
were a sales trader on a financial trading desk, receiving assignments from clients
throughout the day.
Each agent strategy in the market was grouped into 3 buyers and 3 sellers.
The running time for each auction was 1152 seconds (64 assignment “loops”
of 18 seconds each), similar to the 20-minute length of time that was used in
[12]. Assignments were sequentially allocated in pairs (to one buyer and one
seller) every second, thus for each agent the mean time between assignments
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received was 3s. Each assignment “loop” (see Figure 5), agents each received 6
assignments with di↵erent limit prices. As assignments belonging to an agent are
grouped by limit price, when an agent receives a new assignment the assignment
quantity for that limit price was incremented. All agents treat current holdings
of assignments as a single entity, increasing or decreasing their quote price as
a group. However, one or multiple assignments may be traded from a group at
any time if only a certain number are able to transact on the order book. No
retraction of assignments was permitted, and once assignments were distributed,
their limit prices could not be modified. For all experiments, equilibrium was set
at 230 (Figure 5, left), and raised to 300 (Figure 5, right) when a “market shock”
occurred. We do not use the NYSE spread-improvement rule, thus enabling
traders to submit quotes at any price.
When a new assignment is provided to an agent, that agent has the ability
to put it straight on the order book. Although agents can create new orders
immediately, each agent can only update their orders once a sleep-time, s, has
expired. While the agent is asleep (we can think of this as a “thinking” period), it
is still actively able to calculate a new order price using shouts and transactions
in the marketplace. Once sleep-time has elapsed, an agent is able to update
their order price. The ability to put new assignments on the order book as
soon as they are received is an important di↵erence to previous implementations
of sleep-time. An order placed immediately on the book is more advantageous
than delaying a trade by waiting. The sleep-time of each agent was set randomly
within a boundary of ±(0-25)% of the sleep-time provided. This is the same
“jitter” setting implemented in [9]. For all experiments reported here, we set
sleep-time s = 4 seconds. While it is not strictly necessary to enforce a period
of sleep time in agents (on the scale of human reaction times) when the market
contains no humans, we do this to replicate the experimental method of [7] and
[12]. This enables us to directly compare results, and hence challenge or confirm
any of their conclusions.
All experiments were repeated 5 times and results analysed using the non-
parametric Robust Rank-Order (RRO) statistical test [14,15]. The number of
trials was necessarily restricted due to the real-time nature of experiments, with
each run taking approximately 20 minutes.
4 RESULTS
4.1 AA Modifications
Here, we present results from a series of experiments between the “reference” AA
agents from the literature, and the modifications we suggested in Section 2.3.
The e↵ect of Pmax on AA In De Luca’s implementation of AA [18], agents use
the OpEx system parameter Pmax = 400. For the majority of OpEx experiments,
markets were engineered to have an equilibrium value of P0 = 200, exactly half
the value of Pmax, e.g., [7,12]. We believe that the use of this system parameter
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Fig. 6. Smith’s ↵ over time for each homogeneous AA market. AAL produces lower ↵
than AAH , demonstrating that lower values of Pmax artificially encourage equilibration.
AAD performs similarly to AAH , but does not rely on the market dependent Pmax value
and hence is more robust.
by AA agents may produce artifactual dynamics and favourably bias AA agents
(when compared with other agents, such as ZIP, that do not make use of this
system parameter). Here, we test three implementations of AA to observe the
e↵ect Pmax has on AA dynamics: AAL, with low value Pmax = 500; AAH with
high value Pmax = 2000; and AAD, with dynamic Pmax = 2⇥max(limitPrice).
The value used for AAL was purposely set to be approximately twice equilibrium
(set to P0 = 230 in all experiments) to enable comparison with OpEx results.
Note that, since limit price is exogenously assigned to agents via the supply and
demand permit schedules, Pmax will vary between AAD agents. For example,
if an agent, a, receives 2 sell assignments with limit prices 250 and 350, then
Pmax = 700 for that agent, a. For buy assignments, quote prices are implicitly
bounded by zero.
Figure 6 displays mean Smith’s ↵ across 5 runs of homogeneous AAL, AAH
and AAD markets. We see that a lower value of Pmax encourages better market
equilibration by constraining the “exploration” of initial equilibrium values. This
suggests that Pmax introduces an artificial system bias. In heterogeneous markets
(containing 3 AAL and 3 AAH on each side) AAL agents gained greater e ciency
in 4 of the 5 experiments. However, using Robust Rank Order (RRO) [15] this
result was not statistically significant at the 10.3% level.
Table 1 summarises the performance of homogeneous AAL, AAH and AAD
markets. We see that Pmax has virtually no e↵ect on e ciency, but has a large
e↵ect on Smith’s ↵ and profit dispersion. There is no significant di↵erence be-
tween the e ciencies or ↵ values of homogeneous AAD and AAH markets. We
believe the reason AAD did not outperform AAH on these metrics is due to the
assignment distribution pattern. In all experiments, assignments are distributed
in descending order, such that buy assignments with the highest limit prices
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Table 1. Performance of AA with varying values of Pmax. While e ciency varies little
between the three settings, AAL produces significantly lower Smith’s ↵ and profit
dispersion, verifying that the spurious variable Pmax a↵ects market dynamics.
Strategy E ciency Alpha Profit Dispersion
AAL 0.999372 0.0114 97.3
AAH 0.999365 0.0436 204.4
AAD 0.999323 0.0469 253.4
Fig. 7. Trade prices executed in homogeneous markets of AA agents with maxSpread
rule (left) and no maxSpread rule (right). Left: AAMSD agents (maxSpread = 15%)
produce volatile trading dynamics, with execution prices rapidly fluctuating above and
below equilibrium price P0 = 230, within a region approximately bounded by P0±7.5%.
Right: AAD agents (maxSpread = 0%) produce much more stable dynamics, with
executions clustered closely around P0. Since AA
MS
D agents are happy to accept prices
away from equilibrium (within the maxSpread limit), maxSpread markets (left) are
more liquid (produce more trade executions) than non-maxSpread markets (right).
are always allocated first. Therefore, initial values of Pmax for AAD agents are
higher than they would be otherwise.
Having shown that AA agents are sensitive to the system value Pmax, we
propose that AA agents should be modified to dynamically adapt their own
internal value of Pmax. For the remainder of this paper, unless stated otherwise,
we use the dynamic AAD version of AA.
The e↵ect of maxSpread on AA In OpEx version 1 [18], AA agents had
a fixed parameter value maxSpread = 15%. These agents were used in [7] and
[12]. Here, we test the e↵ect of this parameter by comparing homogeneous and
heterogeneous markets containing two AA versions: AAD with no maxSpread
condition; and AAMSD with maxSpread = 15%.
Figure 7 displays the time series of trade prices from one example run of a
homogeneous AAMSD market (left) and homogeneous AAD market (right). As we
would expect, AAMSD markets have greater price volatility and less equilibration
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Table 2. Mean results summary (5 runs) of fast homogeneous markets, allocating
assignments every 3 seconds. ZIPM performs significantly better than ZIPS across all
measures. AAD outperforms AA
MS
D , and significantly dominates overall.
Agent Trials E ciency Smith’s ↵ Profit Disp. Total Shouts Total Trades
ZIPS 5 0.974 0.0664 678.6 4245 582
ZIPM 5 0.995 0.0529 308.6 7479 594
AAMSD 5 0.988 0.0658 530.5 4036 639
AAD 5 0.999 0.0469 253.4 4104 577
to P0, with AAMSD happy to “jump” a spread of 15%. Conversely, AAD agents
will post quotes closer to equilibrium and wait to be “hit”. Table 2 summarises
mean results (5 runs) across all homogeneous markets. Comparing AAMSD with
AAD, we see that the “spread jumping” behaviour of AAMSD results in lower e -
ciency, higher ↵ (less equilibration) and greater profit dispersion. AAMSD markets
also execute roughly 10% more trades than AAD, producing the most liquidmar-
kets of all strategies tested. However, it should be noted that although AAMSD
made more trades, they were not more profitable. In heterogeneous markets
containing 2 agent types (with 3 agents of each type on each side), AAD gained
significantly higher e ciency than AAMSD (RRO, p  0.004).
4.2 ZIP Modifications
Single vs. Multiple Profit Margins We tested multi-profit margin, ZIPM ,
and single-profit margin, ZIPS , in a series of homogeneous markets. Table 2 sum-
marises mean results (5 runs). ZIPM is significantly more e cient than ZIPS
in fast continuous replenishment markets, with 3 seconds between assignments
(RRO, p  0.004). However, this superiority diminishes as the market slows.
With 6 seconds between assignments, ZIPM still has significantly greater e -
ciency (RRO, 0.004  p  0.008), but with 12 and 24 seconds between assign-
ments, ZIPM are no longer more e cient. This suggests that holding a vector
of simultaneously adjustable profit margins is more e↵ective in markets where a
quick response is necessary.
Overall, AAD is the dominant strategy of the four tested (see Table 2), with
significantly higher allocative e ciency and significantly lower Smith’s ↵ than
both ZIPM and ZIPS across all market speeds (RRO, p < 0.048). This confirms
the dominance of AA over ZIP reported in the literature (for the full set of
detailed results, see [22]).
4.3 Market Shocks
Thus far, we have assessed the performance of agents in static markets with
a fixed theoretical equilibrium, P0. Here, we test the performance of agents in
dynamic markets that experience a market “shock”, such that P0 changes value
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Fig. 8. Illustrative example of a market shock. Top row: a positive shock from P t0 = 230
to P t+10 = 300. Bottom row: a negative shock from P
t
0 = 300 to P
t+1
0 = 230. Markets
containing only ZIPM agents (centre) re-equilibrate after a market shock more quickly
than ZIPS (left) and AAD (right). Market dynamics are symmetrically similar for
positive (top) and negative (bottom) shocks.
mid-way though an experiment. For brevity, we only present results for shocks
where the market equilibrium, P0, increases. However, the reader should note
that shocks where P0 decreases are equally likely and lead to symmetrically
similar results (see Figure 8). As such, where buyers benefit from a shock in one
direction, sellers will equally benefit from a shock in the other. When a market
shock occurs, new assignments entering the market are perturbed by the same
value as the shock. For example, if a market shock moves P0 from 230 to 300,
all new assignment allocations are given an increased limit price 70 units higher
than they were before the shock. Real-world financial markets are inherently
dynamic, experiencing continual supply and demand fluctuations. By exploring
dynamic markets we aim to better understand the dynamics of agent traders in
real-world markets.
When a market shock occurs, assignments that have already been allocated
into the market are not recalled. Thus, the actual market equilibrium P 00 does
not immediately move to the new theoretical market equilibrium P0. Rather, P 00
asymptotically tends toward P0, only reaching P0 when all assignments allocated
before the market shock have executed. We use this model of assignment persis-
tency since we assume agents are acting as sales traders—assigned by a client
to buy or sell on their behalf. Figure 8 illustrates example markets containing,
from left to right, ZIPS , ZIPM and AAD agents. In each case, we see transaction
prices gradually tend toward the new equilibrium after a market shock. These
results are di↵erent to those seen in discrete trading day experiments presented
in the literature, where markets tend to re-equilibrate much quicker. However,
we believe the setup we use here to be a more accurate model of real markets.
Table 3 summarises the mean profits of traders across 5 experiments with
positive market shocks; i.e., shocks in which P0 increases. Results for negative
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Table 3. Mean profit in positively shocked homogeneous markets.
Average Profit Per Trade
Strategy Buyers Sellers % di↵erence
ZIPS 97.08 71.65 35.50%
ZIPM 90.62 72.50 24.99%
AAD 98.28 69.46 41.49%
market shocks are symmetrically similar. For brevity, we do not present results
for negative shocks, since all conclusions drawn are the same as those for posi-
tive shocks. We see that, in all cases, positive shocks benefit buyers (similarly,
negative shocks benefit sellers). This is because, for the period that P 00 is be-
low P0, buyers have the opportunity to trade at a “cheap” price. In Figure 8,
top row, the area between the new equilibrium line (in red) and the transaction
time-series (in blue) is additional profit that buyers are making and that sellers
miss out on (similarly, for negative shocks, bottom row, this is additional profit
for sellers). We can quantify this by the percentage di↵erence in the average
profit per trade of buyers and sellers (Table 3). We see that ZIPM markets have
significantly lower profit spread (RRO, 0.071 < p < 0.089), indicating quicker
re-equilibration after market shock. There is no significant di↵erence in profit
spread between ZIPS and AAD markets. We believe shocked homogeneous mar-
kets containing ZIPM agents are able to re-equilibrate more quickly due to ZIPM
agents’ ability to update multiple orders each time they “wake”. Thus, if we ran
further experiments using AAD agents with multiple profit margins, we would
similarly expect a decrease in re-equilibration time.
However, while both AA and ZIP agents are able to re-equilibrate after mar-
ket shocks, neither algorithm is specifically designed to anticipate price move-
ments following a shock. In the following section, we explore the e↵ects of adding
such a novel mechanism.
4.4 Assignment-Adaptive Agents
If an agent is capable of analysing their own assignments to see if there is an
inherent rise (or fall) in value, then it may be possible to infer that a market shock
has occurred, thus enabling the agent to anticipate a rise (fall) in transaction
prices. By adjusting profit margins accordingly, the agent may be able to secure
greater profit. Here, we introduce a preliminary method for agents to adapt
their profit margins using information contained in their own assignment orders.
We call these agents Assignment Adaptive (ASAD). This is exploratory work
and is not intended to be a definitive solution. Rather, we are more interested
in the dynamics of markets that contain such agents. For all experiments, we
use ZIPM agents, previously shown to most quickly re-equilibrate after market
shocks. Once again, we present results for positive market shocks only. However,
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Fig. 9. Illustrative example of an agent’s assignment sequence, subject to a negative
market shock after assignment 42. Blue dots plot the limit price of each assignment.
The black line plots a moving average over 20 assignments (the ASAD agent memory
window). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is used to calculate the grandient of
change in assignment prices (i.e., the gradient of the moving average), which between
assignments 43 and 61 is significantly negative, indicating a negative market shock.
results for negative shocks are symmetrically similar and the same conclusions
can be drawn for shocks in both directions.
ASAD agents store assignment limit prices in a rolling memory window con-
taining the last 20 prices, ordered oldest to youngest. Agents only begin acting
on these prices once the window is filled (i.e., once an agent has received and
stored 20 assignment prices). ASAD agents then calculate the gradient of change
in assignment prices using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression [21], such
that gradient, r, is:
r =
X
xiyi   y
X
xiX
x2i   x
X
xi
, (8)
where xi is the index position of assignment limit price yi in the assignment price
window. Figure 9 provides a visual example of how this gradient calculation can
help to detect a change in prices. This gradient value, r, is then transformed
using a simple logarithm function, in order to return a value greater than 1 for
positive gradients and a value less than 1 for negative gradients:
  =
(
 ln(1 r) if r < 0
ln(r+ 1) otherwise. (9)
We call this value the shock indicator,  . Values of   > 1 indicate prices in the
market may increase; values of   <  1 indicate prices in the market may fall.
ASAD agents use   to alter profit margin according to the following two
rules:
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Fig. 10. Example of a positive market shock in a homogeneous ASAD market. The
market quickly reacts to the shock, but initially overshoots the new equilibrium.
if (seller & phi > 1) increase profit margin,
if (buyer & phi < -1) increase profit margin.
While   > 1 for sellers (or   <  1 for buyers), agent calculated quotes
are increased, or inflated, by 20%. To prevent ASAD agents from returning to
market clearing price (P 00) too early after a shock is detected, the cumulative
value of   is used to “wind-down” ASAD price inflation from 20% to 0% over
time. This decline in percentage over time is proportional to the size of the
cumulative value of  , reduced (increased) by 0.5 every time the ASAD agent
can update its orders (subject to no current shock occurring), until cumulative
 , and therefore percentage, equals zero.
Results from one homogeneous market containing ASAD agents is shown
in Figure 10. We see that immediately following a positive market shock prices
begin to rise. Prices then overshoot the new equilibrium value, before returning to
near-equilibrium value. This suggests that ASAD agents are sensitive to market
shocks, but require tuning. In homogeneous markets with all ASAD agents,
sellers benefit from a positive market shock, being able to either match or beat
buyers’ average profit. This is in stark contrast to ZIPM markets, where sellers
consistently lose out by a margin of ⇡ 25%. Further, very little profit is lost
in the market itself, suggesting that assignment adaptation can equalise profit
between buyers and sellers during a market shock.
However, when testing ASAD (adapted ZIPM ) agents in positive shock mar-
kets containing na¨ıve ZIPM agents, results were somewhat surprising:
– In heterogeneous markets containing six ASAD and six ZIPM agents, ASAD
sellers performed significantly worse than ZIPM sellers. Surprisingly, ZIPM
sellers also outperformed all buyers.
– In heterogeneous markets containing eleven ZIPM agents and only one ASAD
seller, once again the profits of every ZIPM seller was increased, while the
ASAD agent significantly under-performed.
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Fig. 11. Normal form matrix of results between competing ASAD (adapted) and non-
ASAD (na¨ıve) agents. Homogeneous markets of adapted (ASAD) agents perform better
than homogeneous markets of na¨ıve (ZIPM ) agents. However, in heterogeneous mar-
kets, na¨ıve (ZIPM ) agents gain while adapted (ASAD) agents lose.
– The profit spread between buyers and sellers of homogeneous markets con-
taining twelve ZIPM agents was significantly higher than in markets con-
taining at least one ASAD agent; although in every case the ASAD agent(s)
su↵ered.
These findings suggest that ASAD agents generate a new price signal to which
price sensitive ZIPM agents can react and benefit. However, ASAD agents them-
selves su↵er from the resulting behaviour of ZIPM agents. If we consider longer-
term market evolution, a population of ASAD agents can be easily invaded by
ZIPM . If the entire market is ASAD then everyone benefits, but if any non-ASAD
agent enters the market, it parasitically benefits from the behaviour of ASAD
and will flourish, eventually exterminating the ASAD agents from the market-
place. We summarise these outcomes in Figure 11. Although these results may
appear counter-intuitive, such dynamics are not unusual in co-adaptive systems
of competing populations (for example, see [1,3,4]).
Potentially, these findings could be due to the simple ASAD strategy imple-
mented here. For example, ASAD agents are not designed to consider the rate
of change of prices in the market. Perhaps a more suitable approach would be
to implement an adaptive learning rule, such as the Widrow-Ho↵ delta rule [28],
which is the basis of the adaptation mechanism in ZIP [8] and AA [26]. We
reserve this extension for future work.
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5 CONCLUSION
We have used the Exchange Portal (ExPo) platform to perform a series of agent-
based computational economics experiments between populations of financial
trading agents, using continuous replenishment of order assignments.
In the first set of experiments, we exposed several idiosyncrasies and am-
biguities in AA and ZIP, two of the standard “reference” algorithms from the
literature. First, we showed that ZIP performs better in fast markets when agents
contain a vector of profit margins that they can update simultaneously. Then, for
AA agents, we demonstrated how Pmax provides unfair information about the
market and how the algorithm can use readily available information to overcome
this. Finally, we demonstrated how “spread jumping” in AA negatively a↵ects
market dynamics and performance.
In the second set of experiments, we introduced market “shocks” and pre-
sented a novel exploratory Assignment Adaptation (ASAD) modification to ZIP.
Results showed that homogeneous populations of ASAD agents perform better
than homogeneous populations of ZIP agents. However, in heterogeneous ASAD-
ZIP populations, ZIP agents perform better while ASAD agents perform worse.
This suggests that ASAD agents provide a novel price signal that benefits ZIP,
to the detriment of ASAD agents themselves.
This work naturally suggests further extensions. Firstly, to expose the bene-
fits of dynamically selecting a value of Pmax, we set Pmax = 2⇥max(limitPrice).
The multiplier value, 2, was arbitrarily selected and should be optimised for per-
formance. Secondly, it is likely that the introduction of an adaptive learning al-
gorithm (similar to that used by ZIP) could improve the performance of ASAD.
Thirdly, unlike ZIP agents, AA agents have never been adapted to contain a
vector of profit margins that they can update simultaneously (i.e., an AAM ).
We reserve these avenues of research for further work.
Perhaps more interestingly, we also reserve more general open questions for
future exploration. Firstly, in the work presented here all market shocks are
exogenous. It would be very interesting to see how results are a↵ected when
shocks are endogenous to the market. However, to answer this, it is first necessary
to have agents acting as “proprietary” (“prop”) traders—buying and selling on
their own behalf for profit—rather than “sales” traders (trading on behalf of a
client). This is a more di cult challenge, but one that is pertinent if we are to
further our understanding of the global financial markets. Secondly, since real
financial markets include human traders and “robot” automated trading agent
systems, we hope to explore the dynamic interactions between these groups by
introducing human participants into our experiments. ExPo has been specifically
designed to enable human participation; and further, since ExPo participants
(whether human, or robot) connect to the exchange using HTTP messaging
across a network, ExPo allows geographically dis-located human participants to
sign in via a web browser and then leave or return at will. Theoretically, this
enables us to run experiments with large numbers of participants, over long time
periods of days, weeks, or even months. As far as we are aware, this has never
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been done before and has the potential to provide valuable insight into real world
financial markets.
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